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of morality," in some sense or other, against the views of "moral skeptics," and the greater part of the section is occupied with accounts of the views of certain "moral skeptics" both ancient and modern, and criticisms upon particular points in their views. But what exactly does Professor Störing mean when he says that "morality is valid"? His "positive" argument in favor of its validity seems to consist in an attempt to show, by "psycho-genetic" considerations, that so long as certain "permanent and universal functions" of the human mind remain what they are now and always have been, men always will make the "moral valuations" which he has expressed in his principle. But this implies that they do now make, and always have made, these valuations; and in what sense is this true? Does he really mean to assert that men always have attached a moral value to those volitions, and only to those, which his principle declares to be moral? The claim would seem to be monstrous; and certainly he says nothing sufficient to prove it. And yet, unless he does mean to make this monstrous claim, his argument obviously cannot prove that "morality is valid" in the sense of proving that any particular kind of volition really is and will continue to be "moral." For, unless he makes this claim, he must admit that men may sometimes value volitions which are not really "moral," and fail to value those which are really "moral;" and hence that the question whether a particular volition is and will continue to be really "moral" can, in no case, be decided by proving that men will continue to value it.

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DIE KULTUR DER GEGENWART. Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele. Herausgegeben von Paul Hinneberg. Teil I, Abteilung VI. Systematische Philosophie. Von W. Dilthey, A. Riehl, W. Wundt, W. Ostwald, H. Ebbinghaus, R. Eucken, Fr. Paulsen, W. Muench, Th. Lipps. Berlin und Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1907. Pp. viii, 432.

Under the editorship of Prof. Paul Hinneberg, of Berlin, the well-known firm of B. G. Teubner is publishing a comprehensive work on the evolution and aims of contemporary civilization. The object of the undertaking is to present a broad and sys-

tematic view of our civilization and to trace it to its origins. The chief results of the different fields of knowledge and their applications, their significance for modern culture as well as for future progress, are to be set forth in broad outlines by the leading representatives of the various sciences and their technologies. The plan of the work embraces four large divisions, Parts I and II dealing with the mental sciences (religion and philosophy, literature, music and art, the state and society, law and economics); Part III with the natural sciences (mathematics, the inorganic and organic sciences, medicine); and Part IV with their technical applications (architectural, mechanical, industrial, agricultural, commercial technology). Thus far, six volumes of Part I and one volume of Part II have come from the press, bearing the following titles: "The General Foundations of Contemporary Civilization;" "The Oriental Religions;" "The Christian Religion, including Israelitic-Jewish Religion;" "Systematic Philosophy;" "The Oriental Literatures;" "The Greek and Latin Literatures and Languages;" "Systematic Jurisprudence." These volumes are intended for the general educated reader and have already found their way into many German homes, but they cannot fail to be of interest and value even to those who possess a wider and more technical knowledge of the different branches of learning represented. In giving a bird's-eye view of the various sciences, in placing before one the main results achieved as well as pointing out new problems and indicating the lines of future progress in each field, they render a service which cannot be performed too often.

Volume VI, the book before us, deals with systematic philosophy and contains the following contributions: "The Nature of Philosophy," by Wilhelm Dilthey (pp. 1-72); "Logic and Epistemology," by Alois Riehl (pp. 73-102); "Metaphysics," by Wilhelm Wundt (pp. 103-137); "The Philosophy of Nature," by Wilhelm Ostwald (pp. 138-172); "Psychology," by Hermann Ebbinghaus (pp. 173-246); "The Philosophy of History," by Rudolf Eucken (pp. 247-281); "Ethics," by Friedrich Paulsen (pp. 282-312); "Pedagogy," by Wilhelm Muench (pp. 313-348); "Æsthetics," by Theodor Lipps (pp. 349-388); "The Problems of the Philosophy of the Future," by Friedrich Paulsen (pp. 389-422). All these contributors are scholars of recognized ability whose names inspire con-

fidence and whose words carry authority with them. The articles are popular in the best sense of the term; they are written by masters, presented in clear and intelligible language, as free as possible from subtleties of thought and expression, brief in compass without being overcrowded with material demanding fuller treatment, and altogether suited to the needs of the persons for whom they are meant.

As an expression of German philosophical thought to-day, this sixth volume has particular value for us. It is interesting to observe that most of the articles deal with fundamental philosophical problems, and that nearly all of them are characterized by a tendency to idealism. The former distrust of metaphysics, which accompanied the triumphal march of the natural sciences during the nineteenth century, seems to be growing somewhat weaker; the metaphysical instinct is too strong to be completely and permanently stifled; metaphysics will out. Wundt, Ostwald, Eucken and Paulsen are all metaphysicians; they all regard the attempt to reach a consistent *Weltanschauung* as a legitimate and necessary effort of thought. They all point out the inadequacy of the materialistic solutions of the world problem, and most of them incline toward a monistic idealism in some form or other. This reaction in favor of the discussion of ultimate questions is not peculiar to the professional philosophers; indeed, it is perhaps stronger with certain leaders of science than with the *Fachphilosophen*. We have only to refer to Ostwald, Haeckel and Mach, thinkers who proclaim themselves as opposed to metaphysics, but who are metaphysicians none the less, "Metaphysiker wider Willen," as Wundt aptly calls them. And in other departments of research, in mathematics, theology, sociology, jurisprudence, we find the same revival of speculation; everywhere attempts are being made "to see things together," to transcend the merely factual, to construct systems.

At the same time it is not the old rationalistic metaphysics of Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff that is advocated in this book. The old faith in logic-proof systems, in demonstrable constructions of thought, is dead. The empirical-speculative method has taken the place of the logical-dialectical method. Indeed, says Paulsen, metaphysical speculations do not lie within the province of real scientific knowledge. "At the same time it is not possible for human thinking to halt at the boundaries of what is

scientifically known. The human mind cannot stop with the fragments of knowledge which it has so diligently gathered in the natural sciences and in history; it has an interest, a profound theoretic interest, in the whole, in the solution of questions concerning the nature and connection of all things" (p. 409). And after all, Paulsen thinks, this is Kant's meaning also; he rejects metaphysics as *a priori* necessary scientific truth, *i. e.*, the *aprioristic* form of the old systems, but has no objection to a philosophy which modestly undertakes to construct a theory of reality on the basis of facts. Wundt exhibits a similar modesty in discussing the function of philosophy. The philosopher, he declares, ought to decide not to begin anew the task of solving the world problem in all its parts; he ought to take up the attempts at such solutions as are indicated by the different sciences, compare them with each other, weigh carefully their different claims, and, so far as possible, carry them to their legitimate conclusions (p. 133). It is his business to judge between the pretensions made by the particular sciences, and to resolve their contradictions, always having a strict regard for the general principles of epistemology. The fundamental presupposition of a philosophical metaphysics is that the different parts of human knowledge cannot contradict each other, and that where such contradictions exist the cause lies not in the nature of things, but in our one-sided or erroneous conceptions. We must never forget, however, first, that no other reality exists for us than the world of phenomena, and, secondly, that we cannot deduce from the ultimate notions, to which we ascend in metaphysics from the particular fields of research, these same particular facts, as the physieist deduces certain natural phenomena from fixed presuppositions. Ostwald's general point of view does not differ materially from that of Wundt and Paulsen. What he calls *Naturphilosophie* is as much metaphysics as the systems of Wundt and Paulsen; it is simply the *Weltanschauung* of a natural scientist. The philosophy of nature in the modern sense, he tells us, means nothing but a synthesis of our total knowledge of nature, taking this word in the broadest sense. Hence it does not differ in aim from the philosophy of nature of earlier periods, but in its method it has come to recognize the duty of applying within its entire field the tool of scientific criticism which has been fashioned and is being constantly improved (p. 171). Ostwald,

as we see, betrays the same weak faith characteristic of modern metaphysics; he, too, despairs of reaching absolute truths in natural philosophy. Mankind, according to him, is engaged in the task of extending and intensifying its most general notions; but these do not, at any fixed period, represent a system absolutely valid for all future times. But, we are thankful to note, this relativism does not prevent Ostwald from plunging right into metaphysics and offering a system of thought that aims to explain every known fact of the universe.

Dilthey accepts the view of metaphysics which is held by the thinkers just mentioned. For him, too, its aim is to solve the problem of the world and of life, and its form is universal validity. But Dilthey regards the problem as insoluble. With one of its aspects metaphysics faces religion and poetry, with the other the particular sciences. But it is not science in the sense of the particular sciences, nor is it art or religion. Philosophy cannot penetrate the essence of the world through a system of metaphysics and give a universally valid proof of such knowledge. But just as in every serious creation of art a phase of life not seen before is revealed to us, just as poetry places before us the different sides of life in works that are eternally new, and just as we possess in no work of art the total view of life and yet approximate this total view through them all, so one and the same world confronts us in the typical world-views. Each one represents this world as it appears when a mighty personality subordinates the other possible attitudes to one of them, and brings under the categories contained in this attitude all the other categories (p. 61). We can perceive only one side of our relation to the world, never our total relation, as it would be defined by the union of the different categories of being, cause, value and purpose. This is one reason for the impossibility of metaphysics. Another reason lies in the nature of these categories or attitudes themselves. We can deduce neither change nor plurality from the unchangeable unity. An absolute value is a postulate, but not a realizable concept. And we cannot discover a highest or absolute end since this presupposes an absolute value. Dilthey finds that the influence of metaphysics is constantly waning, but that philosophical thinking is gaining in importance in science and in literature.

Philosophy for Dilthey is therefore possible only as a universal theory of knowledge. In this sense philosophy is the

fundamental science which studies the form, laws and connections of all thought-processes having universal knowledge as their goal. As logic it examines the conditions of evidence, as epistemology it examines the validity of the presuppositions of our knowledge: the consciousness of the reality of experience and the objectivity of external perception. It clears up the methods of the particular sciences by means of general logic; it brings unity and connection into the conceptions which have been developed in the sciences; it examines the presuppositions, the aims and the limits of the particular sciences; and applies the results thus gained to the problem of the inner structure and connections in the two great groups of natural sciences and mental sciences (pp. 63, 64).

We have here the familiar Neo-Kantian interpretation of philosophy as logic and theory of knowledge. A similar standpoint is held by Riehl in his paper on "Logic and Theory of Knowledge," which is a good survey of the whole field. Logic is the doctrine of the form of science in general; it is the most universal science, which therefore cannot and need not be proved. Epistemology or the theory of knowledge has for its problems the origin of knowledge, its reality and the determination of its limits (p. 88). Apriorism and evolutionism do not exclude each other; the view that Darwin has refuted Kant can no longer be held (p. 90). Indeed, Riehl holds, Kant's critical philosophy has the same mission to perform to-day as it formerly performed: to put an end to the doubts in the certainty and reality of experiential knowledge which have found their way even into scientific circles (p. 94). The principles of our knowledge of experience are immutable; only the experiences under the control of these principles are constantly advancing (p. 99).

We see, for the epistemologist there is a limit to evolutionism; something must persist in the flux of knowledge; the guiding principles do not change. In his suggestive and instructive paper on the "Philosophy of History," Eucken makes use of this idea. A real truth, he says, can nevermore pretend to be valid for a mere space of time; it holds absolutely, without relation to time. It does not become temporal by being in time for man; rather, this is the main reason of its greatness and the chief motive of its efficiency—that it transposes life to a timeless reality. It is not otherwise with the good which is

thereby most sharply distinguished from the useful. For the latter is bound to its place in time, and what suits one age may be harmful to another; but the good leads to an elevation beyond all temporal changes because it does not from the outset aim at action in mere time, but unfolds a new order over and above the temporal order (p. 270). Truth and goodness, however, do not realize *themselves* in history, according to Eucken. The world-process is not driven forward by the inevitable necessity of reason, as some of the idealistic interpreters of the world and of history teach. The spiritual life does not directly realize itself in history; it is placed before us as an ideal which demands our recognition and acceptance. Eucken preaches a vigorous ethical idealism. We must fight for the rational character of our life and for the spiritual line of progress. Our spiritual life and its forms are the products of our own acts and decisions (p. 278). For that reason it is especially the great personalities that count, for these personalities are never mere products of the social environment. What makes greatness great is the fact that in it the spiritual stage becomes a complete end in itself. Great personalities do not rise out of the times, but raise the times up to them. Hence there can be no philosophy in the sense of a construction of history, or the establishment of a comprehensive formula permitting the calculation of the future. But we can and must have the philosophical conviction which endeavors to find an inner relation of this field to the whole of life and seeks to illuminate it from the standpoint of the whole, and there is no reason why this should not be called the philosophy of history (p. 280).

The papers on Psychology, Ethics, Pedagogy and *Æsthetics* are written by authorities in these fields and will prove most helpful to general students of philosophy. Ebbinghaus's account of psychology is based upon his "Grundzüge der Psychologie," the second volume of which, unfortunately, has not yet been published, but has been utilized by the author in preparing the present outline. It offers a clear presentation of the history of psychology, sharply distinguishes the stages of progress in the development of this science, discusses the ever-interesting problem of the relation between the body and mind, and studies both the elementary and the more complex forms of mental life. It is one of the virtues of German experimental psychologists that they do not limit themselves to a study of ele-

mentary mental processes, but pay attention to such forms as are treated by Ebbinghaus in his last section: speech, thought, belief, religion, art, morality. It must be confessed, however, that this section is the most superficial part of Ebbinghaus's presentation. Paulsen's account of ethics is founded upon his "System der Ethik," a book which is almost as well known in America as in Germany. No contemporary philosopher excels Paulsen in the ability to express his thoughts with clearness, force and precision; and none is better fitted to act in the rôle assigned to him by the editor of this volume. Both his contributions, the one on ethics and the one on the future problems of philosophy, from which we have already quoted, are fine specimens of the popular presentation of philosophical problems. His ethical standpoint, which he calls teleological energism, is brought into harmony with his idealistic monism. One of the best papers in the volume is that on Pedagogy by Muench. The writer possesses great clearness of vision and sanity of judgment. He discusses many important educational problems, states the solutions which have been offered to them, and shows what is good and what is bad in the different programs of education. He is gifted with an hospitable mind; he does not blindly follow German custom, but knows and appreciates the efforts which are being made in other countries to solve educational problems. The bibliography given by him is one of the best in the book.

Lipps's article on *Æsthetics* reproduces the views presented in his large work on "Æsthetik, Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst," the first two volumes of which have appeared. The editor could hardly have found a more thorough student of the subject than this scholar of Munich. According to Lipps, the future problems of *Æsthetics* are: to work out more accurately the notion of *Einfühlung*, which has come to play such an important part in German *æsthetics*; to establish more definitely the general formal *æsthetic* principles and the possibility of their application to particular cases; and to point out more clearly the uniqueness of *æsthetic* evaluation and *æsthetic* judgment. This work presupposes a thorough knowledge of psychology, which only the psychological expert can lay claim to possessing. But, he declares, it is not enough to base *æsthetics* on psychology. There is needed also exact observation of countless beautiful forms, mathematically exact observation, for ex-

ample, of even the smallest and simplest architectonic forms. Lipps also reminds us in this connection that the infinite wealth of our emotional life is not exhausted by the monotonous antithesis of pleasure and pain. A mere pleasure-pain psychology cannot reach the essence of æsthetic feeling. He also repudiates the attempts of the psychologists who seek to reduce all æsthetic feelings to bodily and organic sensations.

The publishers of the work deserve credit for the excellent way in which they have solved the technical problems of this great enterprise, for the fine typography, the good paper, printing and binding. The volume is supplied with a table of contents and an index. Bibliographical references are appended to the different papers, but they are as a rule very unsatisfactory. In a work of this kind which is intended for the general reader, well-selected lists of books would prove very helpful, and the value of the different contributions would have been enhanced by the insertion of completer bibliographies. This, however, is a defect that can be remedied in future editions, and it is to be hoped that the publishers will insist on its being done.

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THE KEY TO THE WORLD'S PROGRESS. By Charles Stanton Devas. London: Longmans Green & Co., 1906.

It is an ungracious task to criticise this book. Its author is evidently informed by a deeply religious spirit. He is also well and honorably known as a writer on economic questions. His historical knowledge, if neither very critical nor very accurate, has at least a wide sweep and is not defaced by violent or uncharitable prejudice. Yet his book from beginning to end is a distortion of history all the more gross that it is apparently quite unconscious and sincere. Far from being a key to the world's progress, it is the demonstration that the actual world has not followed the true line of progress, that it has proved itself a refractory lock into which the key will by no means fit.

"We need," says Mr. Devas, "an imperial theory of history." Nothing can be more true. But nothing can be less imperial than the theory he has provided. It is provincial in the last degree, and even in the short time which has elapsed since his